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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEIGH FURNITURE & CARPET CO.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 17264

v.
T. RICHARD ISOM, d/b/a
RICHARD'S FINE FURllISHINGS,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Nature of the Case
In an action filed by Plaintiff-Appellant Leigh Furniture
& Carpet co. to cancel a contract for the sale of a furniture

business located in St. George, Utah, Defendant-Respondent T.
Richard Isom counterclaimed against the Plaintiff-Appellant
Leigh Furniture, alleging that the Plaintiff and its President,
W. S. Leigh, tortiously interferred with Defendant's business
and prospective economic advantage by wilful and malicious
conduct designed to force the Defendant out of business.
(Respondent will cite the pages in the record as follows:
Trial transcript, "Tr.--;" court file, "R.--," and exhibits,
"Exh.--.")
Disposition in the Lower Court
On February 24, 1975, Plaintiff-Appellant Leigh Furniture
commenced an action against Respondent to cancel a contract
between the parties whereby Respondent Isom purchased a
furniture business from Appellant.

Respondent had paid
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$53,000.00 of the $80,000.00 purchase

pr~ce

and tendered the

balance of $27,000.00 prior to receiving notice that legal
action had been conunenced.

Appellant also sought to restrain

Respondent from conducting any further business on the premises
which were under lease from Appellant.

(R.

1-8)

Defendant Isom filed a Counterclaim against Appellant,
alleging that Appellant and its principal owner, W. S. Leigh,
engaged in a concerted course of intentional, malicious conduct
designed to force Isom out of business and bring his business
relationships to an end so that Plaintiff could take back the
business and leased property.

(R. 27-30; Appendix A attached

hereto)
At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff in the
amount of $65,000.00 general damages and $35,000.00 punitive
damages.
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict
or for New Trial was denied by the trial court.

However, the

court determined that a remittitur of punitive damages to 20%
would be "reasonable" and directed Defendant to accept a
reduction of punitive damages to $13,000.00 or else a new trial
"on the issue of punitive damages" would be granted.
115-16)

(R.

Defendant accepted the renittitur, reserving his right

of cross appeal.

(R.

117)

Following Plaintiff-Appellant's appeal herein, Defendant
cross appealed on the issue of the remittitur of the punitive
damages.
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I

!
_.....,_

Relief Sought on Appeal
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmance and reinstatement
by this Court of the jury's verdict and judgment for the full
amount awarded by it.
Statement of Facts
Respondent takes issue with Appellant's Statement of Facts
and "Abstract of Nitnesses" as being incomplete and laced with
conclusions and opinions which appear to reargue the evidence
presented to the jury.

Appellant states facts favorable to

Appellant's contentions and ignores substantial evidence which
supports the jury's verdict.

Furthermore, many of Appellant's

statements are not supported by proper citations to the record
on appeal.

Therefore, Respondent provides the following

statement of facts:
Prior to 1969,

w. s.

(Dub) Leigh and his family owned and

operated a furniture and interior decorating business known as
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. with stores in St. George, Cedar
City and Kanab.

(Tr. 90, 523-528)

In the fall of 1969 Leigh

contacted Respondent T. Richard Isom to see if Isom would be
interested in working at the furniture store in St. George,
Utah, and later buying the store.

('!{~ 90, 94, 324-26)

Isom

terminated his other employment in the State of Washington and
came to St. George where he began employment under Leigh in
charge of the store's business and sales records.

The

accounting and bookkeeping for all of the store owned by Leigh
was done by Eldon Ashdown at the store in Cedar City.

('R?'

326-28)
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3

At first Leigh promised to sell the business to Isom and
two other employees, Watkins and Francis Leany.

Later discus-

sions about only Isom buying the St. George store occurred in
May of 1970 when it appeared that Leany was not interested and
Leigh was dissatisfied and unhappy with Watkins.
329, 354)

(Tr. 95-97,

Leigh requested Respondent's father, Orville Isom

(herein referred to as "Orville") , an attorney who had theretofore done some legal work for Leigh, to draw up an agreement
of sale between Leigh and Richard Isom.

Although attorney

Orville Isom advised Leigh to get another attorney, Leigh
insisted that Orville prepare the agreement.

Several drafts

of the agreement were prepared for Leigh, who made suggestions
and requested various changes.

(Tr. 97-99)

Ultimately, Leigh and Respondent Richard Isom executed a
written agreement dated May 24, 1970 (Exh. 1, attached as
Appendix B hereto), whereby Isom purchased all inventory,
merchandise, equipment, fixtures and accounts, etc. of the St.
George store.

The purchase price of $80,000.00 was to be paid

$20,000.00 down, with the balance to be paid over a ten-year
period with interest.

As security for the payment of the

purchase price, Isom agreed to maintain inventory, cash and
receivables of $60,000.00 and to provide Leigh with a physical
inventory every three months and monthly financial statements.
(Appendix B, pp. 1, 2; Tr. 354-56)
The agreement also granted Isom a ten-year lease of that
portion of Appellant's building in which the business was
located, with an option to purchase the building when the
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purchase price for the business had been paid.

(.Zl.pp. B-2, 4)

The store had operated at a loss the first four months of
1970, with a $8,000.00 deficit when Isom took over the business.
(Exh. 44; Tr. 388)
During December, January and February, 1971, Respondent
began having problems with Leigh.

In the winter of 1970-71,

the building furnace required substantial repairs for which
Isom paid the portion required by the agreement; but Leigh
refused to pay the balance.

(Tr. 359-60)

Although he had given Isom an option to purchase the
building, Leigh tried to sell it to others.
he could not sell the property subject to

l'lhen he discovered

~espondent's

ten-year

lease and option to purchase, he resolved to cancel the sales
agreement and get Isom out.

(Tr. 110, 547; Exh. 65)

Leigh

came to Orville in June, 1971, and voiced his dissatisfaction
with the agreement and stated he wanted to sell the building-"the whole ball of wax"--and that he ought to kick Richard out
and put a padlock on the door.

(Tr. 111-13)

In a letter to Richard Isom, Leigh declared he had no
agreement with Respondent and demanded that the latter walk
out and return the business to Leigh.

He represented that he

had contacted people in Salt Lake City and California regarding
purchasing the "complete package."

(Exh. 65; Tr. 536-39)

During this period Leigh also approached two store employees,
offering to sell Isom's business to them.

(Tr. 118)

During 1971 and 1972, Appellant, through Leigh and its
employees, harassed Richard in the operation of the store,
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complaining about Isom' s performance and the way he did business,
disrupting the employees and reducing the efficiency of the
operation.

(Tr. 120-24, 362-71, 386, 415-17, 419-20)

On one

occasion Leigh "stormed" into the store and interrupted
Respondent, with a customer.

Leigh complained about not getting

monthly statements and claimed Respondent was in default of the
sales agreement.
allegations.

He demanded a written response to his

The customer left the store.

(Tr. 360-61)

Generally, Leigh would come into the store in a hostile
manner, look over the business as if he had an interest in it
and if it met with his approval.

He complained about the

parking of automobiles in the parking lot, about the merchandise
in the store; told Richard whon he should and should not deal
-,-

with

µL

362, 515, 533); falsely accused Respondent of subletting

the parking lot; and threatened to kick Respondent out and lock
the door.

(Tr. 371-72)

Such visits occurred at least every week from Mr. Leigh,
Mrs. Leigh or Mr. Ashdown.

(Tr. 364, 367, 489, 495)

Although

all payments on the purchase of the store were made within the
60-day grace period permitted by the contract, Leigh continually
accused Isom of being in default for late payment.
394)

(Tr. 234,

Mr. or Mrs. Leigh or Weldon Ashdown would come into the

store and interrogate Isom about the inventory or financial
statements, demanding that he date accounts receivable and
accounts payable and state to whom, for what and when.
369-71, 415-17)

(Tr.

In one week Richard received four letters

complaining about the furnace or not getting statements or

cPtl
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(Tr.

reports.

365)

At Leigh's request, his accountant, Huskinson, called
Orville to say there had to be a change in the business and
that Richard would have to get some outside capital and someone
with furniture experience.

(Tr. 119-20)

Leigh requested

Orville to go to Brent Talbot, who owned Dixie Interiors,
Richard's competitor, to request that Talbot come into the
business.

(Tr. 117, 122)

Hhen Ashdown learned that the Isoms

were talking to a Mr. Hayes Hunter, he informed Mr. Leigh, who
in turn told Orville to forget any ideas about bringing in
Hunter; that he didn't like him and wouldn't have him in the
store.

(Tr. 121-22, 544)

Leigh also continued to openly

complain that he was crazy to give Richard a ten-year lease and
option and what he should do was kick Richard out and sell the
store again himself.

(Tr. 123-24)

In December, 1971, Leigh, through his attorney, Gary Howe,
demanded that Richard submit the business to an independent
audit.

(Exh. 2)

Also, as a result of Leigh's refusal to pay

all of the furnace plumbing repair bill, a lawsuit was filed
by Moss Plumbing against Isom and Leigh in which Leigh asserted
the obligation was entirely Isom's responsibility.
151)

(Tr. 136,

This litigation later resulted in a determination that

Leigh was liable for the repair bill.
In September, 1972, in an effort to remove Leigh's threats
to terminate Richard's business, Orville proposed to have
Richard pay an additional $10,000.00 on the purchase price.
(Tr. 124-26; Exh. 15)

Appellant demanded that Isom prepay
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$20,000.00 and submit to a new agreement or else Leigh would
sue to cancel and foreclose on Richard's business.

(Exh. 21)

Leigh's attorney sent Orville a copy of the Complaint which
Leigh threatened to file.

(Tr.

234-45; Exh. 33, attached as

Appendix D)
In an attempt to resolve all the problems between them
and avoid "any future conflicts," Richard Isom acceded to
Leigh's demand and raised $20,000.00 which he prepaid on the
purchase price of the business.

Respondent also signed a

supplemental agreement dated September 28, 1972, wherein he
agreed, inter alia, to obtain written approval from Leigh
before bringing any additional person into the business;
authorized Leigh to make biannual audits; and agreed to maintain
a minimum of $64,000.00 in inventory, cash and accounts
receivable.

(Exh. 3, also attached hereto as Appendix C)

By making the $20,000.00 prepayment on the contract
principal in 1972, the principal balance was paid up to 1976.
Only $27,000.00 was still owing to Leigh.

(Tr. 125-35)

Although the September, 1972, agreement was intended to
resolve all the disputes between Leigh and Isom, Leigh continued
to pursue two separate lawsuits against Richard Isom relating
to the unpaid plumbing repair bill and a claim by Appellant
against Isom and Frank Leany.

(Tr. 136-37, 174, 184-85, 231,

265)
In the action filed by the plumber for his repair bill,
Leigh continued to assert that Isom was liable.
para. 4(g))

(Exh. 33,

After a trial, the court required Leigh to pay
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the bill.

(Tr. 136-37)

Likewise, with respect to Leigh's

claim that Respondent was responsible for the amount of
furniture drawn from the store by Leany, at the trial in
January, 1973, the court dismissed Leigh's Complaint at the
conclusion of his evidence.

(Exh. 62; Tr. 174-78, 375, 414,

540)
Leigh continued to check up on Richard Isom during 1973.
But because of the substantial prepaY_!llent, there was not much
Leigh could do.

(Tr. 137, 375-76, 381-82)

Richard Isom was

able to operate his business without Leigh's interference and
turned a $27,000.00 net loss in 1970 into a $5,000.00 net
profit in 1972 and a $17,700.00 net profit at the end of 1973.
(Exhs. 45, 47, 48; Tr. 387)
Isorn's store continued to do well into the spring of 1974,
showing over $5,000.00 in profit through April, 1974.

However,

in April, 1974, harassment by Leigh started up again following
the conclusion of the "plumbing" lawsuit.

(Tr. 382-85)

Leigh continually complained to Isom about the store's
inventory, the air conditioner, allegedly delayed financial
statements and the format of the financial statements.
382-85)

(Tr.

Appellant refused to pay for a store window broken

by the adjacent bicycle shop.

(Tr. 385)

The heating bills

began to "pile up" since Appellant wouldn't.pay its share,
requiring Respondent to make trips to Cedar City to clear up
the matter.

(Tr. 151, 261, 389)

As the visitations by Appellant continued, Isom was
required to spend a lot of time to deal with them and Leigh's
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renewed threats of cancellation of the purchase contract.
began to drop off and the store became unproductive.
415-16)

Sales

(Tr. 386,

Demand was made upon Isom to produce various documents

and records, including renewed demands to date accounts payable,
Isom was required to give more attention to Leigh than to the
business.

(Tr. 386, 389, 417, 420, 428, 611)

In the summer of 1974, Orville followed the prior suggestio:
of Leigh and approached Mr. Brent Talbot about joining Richard's
Fine Furnishings.

Mr. Talbot had recently left Dixie Interiors,

(Tr. 117, 122, 137; Exh. 5)

Accordingly, in July, 1974, Orville

Isom wrote to Leigh and Leigh's attorney requesting Leigh's
approval to bringing Talbot ·into the business.

(Exhs. 5, 6)

When no response from Appellant was forthcoming, attorney
Orville Isom again wrote to Leigh requesting a response,
outlining the advantages to Leigh and the need to proceed so
as not to lose the opportunity with Talbot.
response was received from Leigh.

(Exh. 7)

No

(Tr. 144, 542)

On July 22, 1974, Leigh's attorney stated to Orville that
if Talbot was interested in coming into the business, he would
have to contract directly with Leigh and the Leigh/Isom
agreement would have to be terminated.

(Exh. 34)

Even after

extensive correspondence and a tentative verbal agreement
between Isom and Talbot, Orville was unable to get Leigh to
agree to Respondent bringing in Talbot unless Isom agreed to
terminate his contract and the ten-year lease.
Exhs. 24, 26-29, 31, 36)

f~reover,

(Tr. 217, 457;

Leigh continued to insist

that Isom pay him the $4,000.00 involved in the Leany lawsuit

10
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which had been dismissed by the court.

(Exh. 26)

Leigh admitted that he would not let Talbot come into the
business under Isom's "long term" lease.

Leigh insisted that

Isom "step out" of the store and turn it back to Leigh.
155-56, 169, 213-16, 547)

(Tr.

When Orville also requested Leigh's

permission to permit a Mr. Applegate to come into the store
under Richard's contract, no response was ever received from
Leigh.

(Tr. 146-50, 404; Exhs. 10, 11)

The harassment and demands from Leigh continued and occupied
a considerable amount of Respondent's time and attention.
371-72, 386)

(Tr.

By the end of 1974, it became apparent that Isom

would have to pay off the $27,000.00 remaining on the purchase
to keep Leigh from active interference in the affairs of the
store.

Richard spent a lot of time raising the funds instead

of operating the business.

(Tr. 164, 393-94)

Leigh's continuing threats to kick Richard out had only a
demoralizing effect on the business.

(Tr. 396, 419, 428, 611)

The practice of Leigh and Ashdown coming into the store lost
business and Isom received complaints and comments from his
customers.

(Tr. 466-67)

Instead of maintaining the comfortable

profit built up by August, 1974, the business steadily declined
as a result of the problems with Appellant.

By December, 1974,

Respqndent's books indicated he had suffered a $6,499.00 net
loss.

(Exh. 49; Tr. 419, 421, 611)
On December 29, 1974, Orville Isom met with Leigh in San

Francisco where he informed Leigh that Richard was making plans
to pay the last $27,000.00 owed.

Leigh replied that that was
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OK, but he again rejected bringing Talbot into the store with
the long-term lease and option.

He claimed he "had got to move

the property," get rid of the headache and get the property
back from Respondent.

Leigh again demanded that Richard "step

out" of the store, liquidate the stock and turn it back to
Leigh.

(Tr. 155-57)

Leigh also refused to appoint an appraiser

as required by the written agreement so that Isom could exercise
his purchase option.

(Tr. 157; Appendix A-4)

Orville again met with Leigh and his attorney on February
14, 1975, and told them that the $27,000.00 would soon be paid.
Since Leigh claimed to be concerned about the inventory as
security, Orville Isom agreed to permit an inventory to be
taken if Leigh would appoint an appraiser as required by the
contract.

(Tr. 158-60)

Leigh maintained he had "an offer"

to sell the property for $200,000.00

(without the Isom lease}

and therefore would not sell it to Isom for its appraised value
of approximately $125,000.00 to $140,000.00, subject to the
lease.

(Tr. 159-60, 273)

After the meeting, Leigh again

refused to appoint an appraiser so that Isom could exercise
his purchase option.

(Tr. 161; Exh. 13)

Without giving any notice of default, on February 24,
1975, Leigh filed the Complaint in the instant action to cancel
and terminate Isom's interest, forfeit his payments theretofore
made and restrain him from doing further business.
R. 1-8, Complaint attached as Appendix E hereto)

(Tr. 394;
This complaint

was substantially identical to Leigh's proposed Complaint in
1972, even though the prior matters had been resolved by Isorn's
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1

prepayment of $20,000.00.

(Compare Appendixes D & E; Tr. 234-45,

397-98)
Unaware that the Complaint had been filed, Richard Isom,
by letter of February 26, 1975, tendered to Leigh the remaining
$27,000.00 which had been deposited in Dixie State Bank.
14)

(Exh.

Isom requested that Leigh receipt for the payment, appoint

an appraiser to permit the option to be exercised and accept
Brent Talbot as an associate with Richard to operate under the
present lease.

(Exh. 16; Tr. 164-66, 455-57)

When Orville Isom learned of the suit, he contacted Leigh's
attorney, who replied not to worry.

Since Richard had not been

served, they could still negotiate.

(Tr. 167-68)

When Richard

Isom learned of the lawsuit, it had a demoralizing effect; but
he still tried to deal with Leigh and continued to do business
through February, 1975.

No response to the tender was ever

received by Richard, although Leigh told Orville he would never
allow Talbot to come in under Richard's lease.

(Tr. 169-70,

396-97)
In March of 1975, while talking to a customer in his store,
Respondent was served with Leigh's Complaint.

Upon reading the

Complaint, Respondent noted that it reopened the wounds of
1970-72 and looked liked the same Complaint Leigh filed
previously.

(Tr. 397)

Because of the restraining order,

Respondent did not feel that he could conduct further business
and so he closed the store.

(Tr. 396-99)

As a result, Richard's

Fine Furnishings ceased to do business and Respondent was forced
into bankruptcy.

(Tr. 400-405, 421-22, 466-67)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant attempts to re-argue the evidence before
this Court, ignoring the substantial evidence in the record
contrary to Appellant's claims.

A proper review of the entire

record will support the jury verdict.
Appellant was properly held liable for tortious
interference and intermeddling in Respondent Isom's business
expectancies and prospective economic advantages.

One who

engages in a concerted course of conduct to force another out
of business by harassment and tortious conduct is liable to
the one injured for the native consequences of the result he
intended.

There is also ample evidence to support the finding

that the Appellant in no way was privileged.
Relating to Respondent's cross appeal, the trial
court erred when it invaded the "sound discretion" of the jury
by deciding to a remittitur of punitive damage simply because
"a reasonable ratio" is twenty percent.
The jury verdict of $65,000 compensatory damages
and $35,000 punitive damages awarded to Respondent should be
reinstated in its entirety.

The trial court's remittitur should

be reversed and in all other respects the matter should be
affirmed.
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POINT I
THE JURY VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED.
Throughout its Brief, Appellant attempts to reargue the
weight of the evidence presented to the jury.

In so doing,

Appellant ignores much of the evidence contrary to its claims.
As specifically set forth in the foregoing Statement of Facts,
the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence and should
be affirmed by this Court.
Moreover, Appellant's Notice of Appeal indicates that
Appellant appeals only from the denial of its "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict or for New Trial."

(R. 118)

The

standard of review for an appeal from the denial of Appellant's
post-trial motion is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to grant a new trial.

Pollesche v. Transamerican

Insurance co., 27 U.2d 430, 497 P.2d 236

(1972).

Appellant

makes no showing here that there was any abuse of discretion
by the trial court.
Therefore, the issue on appeal is whether the trial court
properly submitted the case to the jury, considering the evidence
in a light most favorable to Respondent Isom and the verdict.
Schow v. Guardtone Inc., 18 U.2d 135, 417 P.2d 643
Whyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1976).
had the exclusive duty to find the facts.

(1966);
The jury

In so finding, the

jury may weigh, accept or reject any conflicting evidence as

15
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it may choose.

A jury finding for the claimant must be viewed

as accepting the claimant's version of the transaction
notwithstanding contrary evidence.

Basin Electric PoweL

Cooperative--Missouri Basin Power Project v. Howton, 603 P.2d
402

(Wyo. 1979).
"Reviewing courts will view the facts in
the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, will indulge in all reasonable
inferences in support of the verdict and
will disregard all inferences and evidence
to the contrary." Terrel v. Duke City
Lumber co., Inc., 86 N.M. 405, 524 P.2d
1021 (1974), modified 540 P.2d 229 (1975)
This Court does not substitute its views for the jury's

unless there is no competent evidence to support the verdict.
Fillmore Products Inc. v. Western States Paving Inc., 592 P.2d
581 (Utah 1979); Snyderville Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Christensen, 609 P.2d 939

(Utah 1980); Uinta Pipeline Corp.

v. White Superior co. 546 P.2d 885

(Utah 1976).

It is axiomatic that the reviewing court will presume
that the jury believed the evidence which sustains its
finding.

Appellant's claims that Respondent had no business

expectation or relationship or that the Appellant was justified
in his malicious, intentional conduct were rejected by the
finders of fact.
P.2d 713

Gessner v. Dairymen Association, Inc., 611

(Utah 1980).

It was the jury's prerogative to judge

the credibility of the witnesses and determine the facts.

Whether

or not Respondent Isom had a reasonable expectation of business
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success or advantage or whether Appellant acted reasonably
or was justified were jury questions to be determined from
the evidence in the record and, having been properly submitted
to the jury, the latter's findings will not be interfered with
on appeal.

Moore v. Prudential Insurance co. of America, 26

U.2d 43, 491 P.2d 227, 230

(1971).

Appellant has not demonstrated any "substantial prejudice"
or "injustice."
548 P.2d 898, 901

Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc.,
(Utah 1976).

Indeed, it appears to Respondent

that "justice" has been well served in this matter by the jury's
verdict.

Therefore, the jury's verdict should be affirmed

and reinstated in its full amount as hereinafter set forth.

17
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POINT II
THE FINDING OF THE JURY THAT APPELLANT IS LIABLE TO ISOM
FOR ITS INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ISOM' S BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Appellant Leigh claims that Respondent's Counterclaim must
fail because Respondent failed to prove a specific existing
contract with a third party.

(Appellant's Brief at 14-16)

As

previously cited, the evidence before the jury amply supports
Respondent's claims that the actions of Leigh were designed and,
in fact, did drive Richard Isom out of business, thereby
terminating his business relationships with his custoners and
others.

By greatly over simplifying of Respondent's claim and

the developing law regarding interference with business
relationships, Appellant mischaracterizes both.

Throughout its

Brief, Appellant merely attempts to knock down a "straw-man" of
its own fabrication.
Although of comparative recent development, the law has
long recognized that a broad range of economic relationships
are entitled to its protection from unreasonable interferences.
Many courts have tended to avoid a complete analysis of the
problem and taken refuge in simplified formulas, thereby
enshrouding the law in "a fog of catch words and rubber-stamped
phrases" upon which Appellant attempts to rely.

B. Izett,

"Interference with Contracts at Will, A Problem of Public
Policy," 25 Brooklyn L. R. 73, 74

(1957-59); Prosser, Handbook

of the Law of Torts, §129, p. 927

(4th Edit., 1971).

By attempting to hide behind a purported lack of a valid,
existing third-party contract, Appellant ignores the fact that
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interference with a specific contract is merely a "subclass" of
the responsibility imposed on those who intentionally interfere
with business relationships.

It is only one of several segments

of the law in which dC!JT\ages may be recovered for unlawfully
causing loss to a person in his business relationships.
Buckaloo v. Johnson, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 537 P.2d 865 (1975);
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §130, pp. 949-53

(4th

Ld., 1971); Restatement of Torts, Second, Chapt. 37, §§766A,
766B, pp. 4-23
6.4, pp.

(1977); G. Alexander, Commercial Torts, §§6.1,

337, 348 (1973); 1 F. Harper and F. James, Law of Torts,

§6.5, pp. 489-495 (1956); J. Estes, "Expanding Horizons in the
Law of Torts--Tortious Interference," 23 Drake Law Review 341,
342 (1973-74); F. Harper,

"Interference with Contractual Relations,"

47 Northwestern U. L. R. 873

(1953).

Included in this area of the law entitled to protection
from wrongful interference are the expectancies of future
contractual relations, the opportunity of obtaining and
maintaining customers and the right to conduct and operate one's
own business.

Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946, 947

.

(1909); Surnwalt Ice co. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 Md. 403,
80 Atl. 48, 50
286 P.2d 474

(Md., 1911); Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 C.A.2d 796,

(1955); \Villiams v. Maloof, 157 S.E.2d 479 (Ga.,

1969); Calbom v. Knudzton, 65 Wash.2d 157, 396 P.2d 148, 151-52
(1964); Sharnhart v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 159 Fla. 629, 32
So.2d 727 (1947); General Beverage Sales Co.--OSH KOSH v. East
Side \linery,

396 F. Supp.

590

(E.D. Wis. 1975); F. Sayre,

"Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 Harvard L. R. 663, 701-702
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(1922-23); J. Dale, "Interference with Business Relation," 5
U.C.L.A. L. R. 341 (1958); 45 Arn. Jur. 2d, Interference, §§49-Si,
pp. 321-24 (1964).

Prosser recognizes that one of the business

expectancies covered by the tort is "the opportunity of
obtaining customers;" the loss resulting from interference can
be measured by looking at the "background of business experience"
rather than a specific, narrow relationship.

Prosser, supra,

at 950.
Society seeks to protect the interest of the individual in
the security and integrity of business transactions and the
freedom of the individual to make contracts.

The law also draws

a line beyond which no member of the community may go in
interrupting contractual negotiations or otherwise intentionally
intermeddling in the business affairs of others.

Instead of

the interest in the security of contracts already made,
Respondent's interests to be protected are those of a reasonable
expectation of economic advantage and a fair opportunity to
conduct a legitimate business without interruption.
and James, supra, at 510.

1 Harper

Prosser, supra, at 949-51; 36 Harvard

L. R., supra.
While this Court has in the past encountered cases involvinc
interference with existing contractual relationships, Respondent
is not aware of any case where a claim of interference with
business expectancies or other relationship not solidified by
contract has come before the Court.

See Gammon v. Federated

_¥ilk Producers Association, Inc., 14 U.2d 291, 383 P.2d 402
(1963); Soter v. Wasatch Development Corp., 21 U.2d 224, 443
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P.2d 663

(1968).

Appellant's confusion in this area of the law is readily
apparent when viewing the inconsistencies of its argument.
Appellant claims that Respondent failed to prove a specific
third-party contract and that Appellant Leigh is not liable in
tort for malicious conduct in breaching its own contract with
Richard Isom.

Even assuming that to be the case, such is a

mischaracterization of Respondent's claim.

The gravamen of

Respondent's claims, as stated in the Counterclaim, is that by
intentional, malicious conduct in breach of its contract with
Isom, Appellant Leigh forced Isom out of his retail furniture
business, achieving the very result he intended.

Counterclaim,

Appendix A.
More specifically, the evidence presented to the jury was
conclusive that Leigh interferred with Richard's business by
Leigh's complaints, harassment, falacious claims and lawsuits
and threats to "kick Richard out."

(R. 113, 118, 122, 133-35,

144-47, 155-57, 169, 185, 261; Exh. 65)

Having received

$53,000.00 of the purchase price, Leigh deliberately refused
to comply with his agreement to appoint an appraiser or to even
respond to Richard's requests to associate others in his business.
All this was motivated by Leigh's animosity for Richard and by

an apparent compulsion to cancel the lease and take back the
business so that Leigh could resell it and the property at a
greater profit.

(Tr. 158, 161, 213-16, 272-73, 547; Exh. 65)

Substantial evidence in the record indicates that Leigh's
conduct adversely affected Isom's operation of the business and
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his relationship with his customers.
386, 419-20, 466)

(Tr. 361, 363-64, 368-71,

And it cannot be ignored that, when left

alone, Respondent was successful enough to turn Leigh's $ 8, ooo. oo
loss in 1970 into a $5,500.00 net profit in 1972 and a $17,000.oo
net profit in 1973.

(Tr. 388; Exhs. 47, 48)

Isom' s business

continued profitable in 1974 until Leigh resumed his harassment
tactics.

(Tr. 386; Exh. 49)

By the beginning of 1975, when

served with the Complaint and Restraining Order, it was obvious
to Isom that he could not continue when his time, attention and
resources were being drained by Appellant.

(Tr. 386, 393-98,

417, 421, 428-29, 455, 611)
Appellant does not seem to recognize that it substantially
interferred with Respondent's valid business expectancies and
potential economic advantages with Respondent's customers and
suppliers--relationships to which Appellant was not a party.
Certainly it would be reasonable to expect that absent Leigh's
interference, Isom would continue a profitable business relation·
ship with past and future customers and suppliers.
Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211, 213-14 (Iowa, 1970).

Clark v.

Although Respondent

showed substantial harm to his business resulting in bankruptcy,
he need only have shown injury to economic relationships with
only a "probability of future economic benefit."

Buckaloo v.

Johnson, supra, at 872.
Liability for interference with a business may be predicated
upon conduct making performance of one's business more burdensome'
more expensive, less profitable.

Goodall v. Columbia ventures

Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (S.D.N.Y., 1974); Lipman v. Bri~
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Elementary School District, SS C.A.2d 224, 3S9 P.2d 46S (1961);
North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Plymouth Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 266 F. Supp. 231

(E.D. Pa., 1967); Scymanski v.

Dufault, 80 Wash.2d 77, 491 P.2d 1050
Hart,

497 S.W.2d 606

(1972); Tippett, Jr. v.

(Tex. App., 1973), aff'd SOl S.W.2d 874;

1 Harper & James, supra, at 499-500; Restatement of Torts,
Second, §766B, p. 22; C. Carpenter, "Interference with Contract
Relations," 41 Harvard L. R. 728

(1927-28).

Liability attaches to one who by his unlawful or belligerent
conduct drives away or interferes with the customers of a
business.

Drouet v. Moulton, 24S C.A.2d 667, S4 Cal. Rptr. 278

(1966); Guillory v. Godfrey, supra; Twin Falls Farm & City
Distributing, Inc. v. D&B Supply Co., Inc., 96 Ida. 3Sl, 528
P.2d 1286, 1294

(1974); Shamhart v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 1S9

Fla. 629, 32 So.2d 727

(1947); Prosser, supra, at 949.

And,

the interference by Appellant directly with Isom's business and
Isom's performance of his relationships with his customers is
just as much an actionable wrong to Respondent as an inducement
of some breach by the third-party customer.

Goodall v. Columbia

Ventures, Inc., supra, 1 Harper & James, supra, at 500; Corbin,
Contracts, §947; Restatement of Torts, Second, §766A, pp.8, 17;
23 Drake L. R., supra, at 883; 47 Northwestern U. L. R., supra,
at 883.
The authorities universally agree that when interference
with future or potential business relationships

(including

customers) or other economic advantage is shown, proof of a
specific, existing contract is not necessary.

Skeels v.
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Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846, 848

(3d Cir., 196{

Buckaloo v. Johnson, supra, at 871; Azar v. Lehigh Corp., 364
So.2d 860

(Fla. App., 1978); Glenn v. Point Park College, 441

Pa. 474, 242 A.2d 895
239, 525 P.2d 228

(1971); King v. City of Seattle, 84 wash.i

(1974); Scymanski v. Dufault, supra, at 1054;

Restatement of Torts, Second, §766B (1977); _ _ _ , "Intentionai
Interference with Basic Relations," 3 Rutgers L. R. 277, 278-79
(1948-49); 23 Drake L. R., supra, at 344.
In addition to the relationship between Isom and his "thirc·
party" customers, Appellant also interferred with Isom' s agreerne
' • I bc.-f

and business relationship with Brent-Hunte£-in demanding that
Richard agree to cancel his ten-year lease before Leigh would
okay

Ii. f bei
~r.

(Tr. 169-70; Exhs. 26, 34)

No reason was given

for this refusal other than that Leigh wanted his property back,
freed from Isom' s option to purchase.

Leigh also demanded that

Toi bo-f

Hu'f'lte:i; contract directly with Leigh Furni ture--at more favorable;·
terms to Appellant, of course.

(Exhs. 26, 31; Tr. 169, 213-16,
/v 1"6-i

252)

Leigh even tried to deal privately with..fi.w'.l.t.er, behind

Isorn's back.

(Exh.

37)

Both Orville and Richard Isom testified that Richard had
7-;11o..,7

reached an oral agreement from Hw1Lex as to his association with
Richard and the purchasing of the property.
612-14)

(Tr. 217, 4 5 7,

Whether the relationship between Isom and "third-party"

folbC'7

HuMer was an oral agreement or just still "prospective," it

was still a relationship entitled to protection from Appellant's,
interrneddling and interference.
I

Appellant claims that because it did not induce the breach

c/2JJ.
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of a third-party contract, Respondent had only a remedy for
breach of contract.

(Appellant's Brief at 25-26)

Yet the

authorities cited by Appellant do not support Appellant's
position.

For example, Corbin, Contracts, specifically states

that breach of an implied promise not to prevent or hinder
performance of the contract can be the basis for an action in
tort.
[A] and prevention or hindrance should clearly be
regarded as wrongful.
It is practically immaterial whether
the implied promise is a fiction of the court to attain a
desirable result or is a justifiable inference of fact.
In some cases the wrongful conduct could have been treated
as a tort; and it can still be so treated if the courts
find it of advantage in the course of justice . . • .
Corbin on Contracts, §947, p. 814.
Even as to the contract between Appellant and Respondent,
Leigh's conduct in forcing Isom out of business was beyond a
mere breach of contract.
Respondent submits that Appellant's conduct was not just
a breach of contract, but also constituted unlawful, tortious
interference with Isom's business.
350-51.

23 Drake L. R., supra, at

In Buxbom v. Smith, 145 P.2d 305 (Cal., 1944), liability

was affirmed for interference with the plaintiff's business where
the defendants gained "unfair advantage" over the plaintiff
through their contractual arrangements with the plaintiff.

The

California court noted the plaintiff's reliance upon the
defendants' performance of the contract and the defendants'
unjustified repudiation of their obligations and attempting to
take over the business.

Id. at 311.

Other courts have affirmed liability for the tortious
conduct of trying to force a plaintiff out of business when a
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contract between the parties was the basis for the defendants'
malicious conduct, such as in the instant case.

Cherberg v.

Peoples National Bank of Washington, 88 lvash.2d 595, 564 P.2d
1137 (1977); Drouet v. Moulton, supra; Terrell v. Duke City
Lumber Company, Inc., supra; Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. , supra.
In Cherberg, a landlord refused to repair the leased prernis;
and terminated plaintiff's lease, forcing the plaintiff restaun:
to close.

The evidence disclosed that the landlord merely desir;

to regain control of the premises in order to erect a new build;:
"which they felt r.iight be more profitable."

The appeals court

held that a lessee should not recov.er in tort for breach of dut;,
arising out of the lease.

The lvashington Supreme Court reversed

the appellate court, reinstating the jury award.
The court held that the wilful refusal by the landlord to
make repairs when under a contractual duty gave rise to an
action in tort for intentional interference with the tenant's
business relationship with its customers.

Recovery in tort was

not denied simply because the tortious conduct "may also be
viewed as a breach of an implied duty under the lease."

564

P.2d at 1142.
The court stated that:
It appears to be the general view that, in those instances
in which the conduct of the breaching party indicates a
motive to destroy some interest of the adverse party, a
tort action ,may lie and items of damage not available in
contract actions will be allowed.
564 P.2d at 1143.
That court wisely distinguished the older cases of ~
Chrysler Corp., 45 Wash.2d 586, 277 P.2d 708 (1954); and~
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y. Chandler, 414 Pa. 304, 200 A.2d 416 (1964) (cases cited in
Appellant's Brief, pp. 18, 24) as incidents where interference
with business were only an incidental consequence of the
defendant's conduct.

But, in Cherberg, as in the instant case,

the motive and purpose of the defendant's conduct was to force
its lessee out of business in order to retake the property--a
result achieved in each case.

(Tr. 169-70, 547)

In Drouet v. Moulton, supra, the defendant sold his tavern
to the plaintiff.

With the purchase payments still owing, the

defendant engaged in conduct intent to destroy plaintiff and
regain control of the business.

The defendant attempted to

accelerate plaintiff's payments under the contract and harassed
plaintiff and plaintiff's customers to the extent that plaintiff's
liquor license was revoked and plaintiff could no longer operate
as a tavern.

The court found it was reasonable for the plaintiff

to elect to close up rather than continue to accumulate expenses
without receipts to meet them.

In sustaining the jury's verdict

of general and punitive damages, the court stated that
. malicious interference with a business is a tort .
for which general damages may be recovered to the extent of
the foreseeable consequences of appellant's conduct.
These damages may include loss of profits and injury to
the value and reputation of a business.
(citations
omitted)
54 cal. Rptr. at 282.
See, also, Guillory v. Godfrey, supra.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal likewise held that a
defendant creditor's breach of financing arrangements with the
plaintiff by seizure and removal of the financed vehicles would
present a jury question of whether such conduct constituted
interference with "prospective economic advantage."

Skeels v.
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Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., supra.

Although reversing an

award of punitive damages, the court affirmed the jury verdict
that the defendant's wilful, tortious conduct destroyed
plaintiff's business.
In Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc., supra, that court
affirmed that the conduct of the business lender directed toward
the goal of ruining the plaintiff's business and acquiring its
assets was tortious.

Defendant Duke City contracted to finance

the plaintiff but later refused to advance more money unless the
plaintiff acceded to various demands to turn over portions of
the business to the defendant.

Additionally, the defendant

usurped much of plaintiff's time and forced the defendant to
sign a disadvantageous supplemental agreement.

Although the

amount of damages awarded Terrel was modified by the New Mexico
Suprel'!le Court, the defendant's liability in tort was affirmed.
540 P.2d at 229.
Although Leigh relies upon the Restatement of Torts, Second,
1

(Appellant\

Appellant ignores its very language in its argument.
Brief at 16-17)

Section 766 relates to liability for inducing

the breach of a subsisting contract by a third person.
Restatement of Torts, Second, §766, supra, at 7-8.

As previously

noted, Respondent has not exclusively relied upon such a claim
in this case.
Section 766A of the Restatement, Second, states the rule
for intentional inte.rference with another's performance of his
own contract with a third person.

Liability is imposed upon

improper interference with a contract between another and a
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i

I

third person by preventing the performance of the other or by
causing his performance to be more expensive.
Second, supra, at 17.

Restatement,

There cannot be any question from the

record that Leigh's conduct did, in fact, increase the burden
and expense to Isom in enjoying his reasonable business
relationships with customers and suppliers.

(Exhs. 45-49)

Appellant argues "no contract shown--therefore, no liability."
Yet Section 766B expressly imposes liability on the intentional
interference with "prospective contractual relations" by
"preventing the other [Isom] from acquiring or continuing the
prospective relation."

Restatement, Second, supra, at 20.

This

section is designed to protect against interference if the
"potential contract" would be of pecuniary value to Plaintiff.
Included are "interferences with the .

opportunity of selling

or buying land or chattels or services and any other relations
leading to potentially profitable contracts."

Ibid. at 22.

As previously discussed, this section of the Restatement is
designed to afford protection to business relations, including
those of customer and supplier, and the freedom to conduct one's
own business affairs.
Appellant argues that the primary reason for Isom's business
problem was a lack of working capital.
22)

(Appellant's Brief at

In its attempt to reargue the weight of evidence, Appellant

has selectively culled Respondent's testimony out of context,
ignoring other substantial evidence supporting the jury's
verdict.

(Tr.

371-72, 386-87, 389, 396, 415-22, 428, 466)

Appellant even omits Respondent's following testimony that there
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was "no other basis upon which [Respondent]
other than the actions of Leigh Furniture.

filed bankruptcy
.

.

(Tr. 421)

While claiming that Respondent's business failed for lack
of working capital, Appellant conveniently avoids the fact that
in 1972, Richard Isom had raised $20,000.00 for additional
working capital for the business but was forced to make a
substantial prepayment to Leigh to alleviate Leigh's continual
threats to cancel the contract.

(Exh. 21; Tr. 421, 122-25)

But for Leigh's unreasonable, extra contractual demands,
Respondent would have had additional operating capital.
All the evidence was properly submitted for the jury's
consideration, including the testimony claimed by Appellant to
support its opinions.

Appellant's views were properly rejected

by the jury on the basis of the entire record.

The jury's

determination that Leigh intentionally and maliciously
interferred with Respondent's business relationships, both
present and future, is adequately supported by the record.
Leigh was properly held liable by reason of his conduct of
tortious interference and the jury verdict should be affirmed.
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POINT III
APPELLANT'S MALICIOUS AND INTENTIONAL CONDUCT WAS NOT
PRIVILEGED.
Appellant also claims a privilege by its harassment and
interference with Respondent's business in that Leigh acted
to protect his investment.

It should be noted that the only

evidence from the record from which Appellant can support its
claim of privileged conduct is Leigh's own self-serving testimony.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 29)
Respondent certainly agrees that in certain cases, lawful
conduct which interferes with the business of others may amount
to justification.
case.

However, that was not the situation in this

The burden was upon Appellant to establish a defense,

a lawful justification or an intention other than to drive
Isom out of business.

Calbom v. Knudtzon, supra, at 152.

The record adequately supports the jury's rejection of
Leigh's claim of justification.

on numerous occasions Leigh

was heard to complain--not about Isom's alleged failure to
live up to the contract--but, rather, that Leigh "must have
been crazy" to give Isom a ten-year lease and that Leigh had
to get the business back so that he could sell the "whole package"
for a greater profit.

Having received the benefit of his bargain

from Isom (e.g., $53,000.00), Leigh sought to deprive Isom
of his benefit.
As early as June, 1971, Leigh openly complained that he
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wanted to sell the property but couldn't do so with Richard's
lease.

Leigh had to do something, he said, and the thing to

do was to get Richard out.

(Tr. 110-13)

In August, 1972, Leigh again bemoans the ten years, wants
to kick Richard out and sell the building.

(Tr. 122-24)

Leigh

requests an appraiser to appraise the property without Isom's
lease.

(Tr. 273)

Later, in 1974 when Isom tried to get Leigh

to appoint an appraiser as required by the contract, Leigh
boasted that he could sell the property for $200,000.00 and
so there was no reason for him to honor his lease with Richard
and sell the property for a lesser sum.

(Tr. 158-61)

Leigh

again admitted he wanted Richard out so he could terminate
the lease.

(Tr. 169, 547)

Appellant's self-serving claim that Leigh had "fully
performed his obligations"

(Appellant's Brief, p. 30) flies

in the face of his own prior conduct and statements.

The claim

that Defendant was in default of the purchase and lease agreement
is nothing more than Appellant's biased and brazened opinions,
unsupported by the record.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 30-31)

The

record does not reflect that Respondent ever refused to comply
with the terms of the contract.

(Tr. 110, 125, 155-56, 169)

Even if Appellant were motivated by a desire to protect
his contractual investment, his refusal to pay his maintenance
bills, refusal to even respond to proper requests for approval,
his attempts to sell the business to others, his reassertion
of the Leany matter after it had been adjudicated, his refusal

32
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I

to appoint appraisers and his attempts to impose extracontractual obligations on Isom are not in any way justifiable
means to protect a purported investment interest.

Respondent

submits that Appellant cannot point to any properly protected
interest that was served by Leigh's malicious, intentional
attempts to force Isom to walk away from the store.
Even more telling is Leigh's refusal to accept Isom's
tender of the remaining balance due on the contract.

If Leigh's

motive was to protect his investment, why, then, would he not
accept the final payment rendered five years before it was
even due?

The reliability of Leigh's testimony, which the

jury weighed, is amply demonstrated in Leigh's letter to Isom
wherein Leigh claims he has "no agreement" with Isom and is
contacting people to sell the "complete package."
Yet on the witness stand,

~~b~

(Exh. 65)

claimed that the letter and

his deposition testimony were a fabrication.

(Tr. 636-39)

Appellant agrees that the jury may look to a "predominate
motive."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 28)

There was substantial,

convincing evidence from which the jury properly found that
the Appellant did not act reasonably to protect economic interests
and that Appellant was not asserting honest claims against
Respondent.

(Tr. 622)

Just because Appellant argues it is

so does not make it so, ipse dixit.

In its essence, Appellant's

motivation throughout this transaction was "personal greed,"
which motive does not supply a justification for participating

33
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in preventing performance.
supp.) at 472.

Corbin on Contracts, §654H (1980

A person is not justified simply in attempting

to further his own economic advantage at the expense of another.
47 Northwestern L. R., supra, at 881.
Appellant cannot be heard to reargue the evidence on appeal,
The jury's is amply supported by the record.
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846

Skeels v. Universa:

(3d Cir., 1964); Barlow v.

International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114
(1974).
Appellant failed to show any valid and proper interest
which Appellant sought to protect.

Appellant's conduct was

clearly motivated by malice and greed sufficient to belie any
claim that his actions were privileged.
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POINT IV
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE FULL AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
AWARDED BY THE JURY AND THEREFORE THE JURY'S VERDICT SHOULD
BE REINSTATED BY THIS COURT.
During the course of the trial, Respondent presented substantial testimony of the wilful, malicious conduct of Appellant
and "Dub" Leigh to force Respondent Isom out of the furniture
business so that Leigh could retake the business and property,
after having received $53,000.00 on the purchase price.

Appellant's

harassment and intimidations effectively precluded Respondent
from making meaningful business decisions or even attending
to his business needs.

(Tr. 386, 428, 611, 371)

Based upon this and other testimony and Respondent's evidence
that his compensatory damages were in excess of $100,000.00,
the jury returned its verdict in favor of Respondent and against
Appellant for the sums of $65,000.00 compensatory damages and
$35,000.00 punitive damages.

(R. 84)

entered judgment for that amount.

(R.

The court thereupon
85)

In response to Appellant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, claiming that excessive damages were
awarded, the court properly stated the rule that punitive damages
must bear a "reasonable relationship" to compensatory damages.
However, the court then determined that a ratio of only 20%
of compensatory damages was "reasonable" since that same
approximate percentage had resulted in other cases.

The
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$35,000.00 in punitive damages was then reduced to $13,000.00.
(R. 115-16)
By imposing a fixed percentage ratio, the trial court
clearly abused its discretion as a matter of law.

The court

did not even purport to make its decision based upon the facts
of this case

(which facts were the jury's prerogative to deter-

mine), but erroneously applied a mathematical ratio predetermined
1

by it on the basis of certain prior cases.
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354

[See Kesler v.

(Utah 1975); and Prince v. Peterson, 538

P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975).)
This Court has properly determined that it is the nature
of the wrongful conduct, and not the amount of the actual damage
awarded, that determines the propriety and amount of punitive
damages.

Nash v. Craigco, 585 P.2d 775, 778

(Utah 1978);

"Developments in Utah Law," Utah Law Review 19 79: 34 7, 36 768.

In Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Ida. 902, 907, 453 P.2d

551, 556

(1969), the Idaho court approved the rule that there

is "no fixed or mathematical proportion, ratio or relation
between . . . actual damages and . . . punitive damages, which
in a proper case may be awarded .

. .

.

In that case the

court affirmed punitive damages of $12, 500. 00 compared to $350 .oo
actual damages.
41

See, also, Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37,

(Utah 1980); Petsch v. Florom, 538 P.2d 1011, 114

(Wyo.

1975); and Oakes v. McCarthy, 267 C.A.2d 231, 73 Cal. Rptr. 127,
147 (1968).
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In Evans v. Gainsford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952),
this Court stated that there is
no method of precise calculation as to the
quantum of . . . [punitive) damages, the exact
amount thereof must necessarily be left to the
sound discretion of the jury as related to the
facts and circumstances in each individual case.
247 P.2d at 434.
This Court in Evans affirmed the trial court's award of punitive
damages in an amount approximately equal to the special and
general damages awarded--a far cry from the 20% ratio of
"reasonableness" set by the trial court here.
In Kesler v. Rogers, supra, the court repeated that
. . . It is sometimes said that such damages should not
be unreasonably disproportionate to the actual damages
suffered or, perhaps more appropriately, to the nature
of the wrong done and the injury caused.
542 P.2d at
359.
(Emphasis added)
Unlike the instant case, Kesler and Prince v. Peterson,
supra, involved suits in equity where this Court was able to
review the decisions of the lower court as the trier of fact
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.

As

previously noted, the court should not so regard the jury's
verdict.

Elkington v. Foust, supra, at 41 .

. In light of Respondent's evidence that his actual damages
were over $100,000.00, Respondent submits that the jury award
of $35,000.00 punitive damages is not at all disproportionate
but actually necessary to adequately reimburse Respondent for
the tortious conduct of the Appellant.
637, 313)

(Tr. 405, 272, 278,

such an award that merely restores Respondent Isom
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and barely makes him whole cannot be said to be shocking to
anyone's conscience nor indicate any corruption or passion
on the part of the jury.

Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile

Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 328
617 P.2d 700

(Utah 1980), modified on rehearing,

(Utah 1980).

In his majority opinion, in Terry, Mr. Justice Maughan
opined that because of the variables involved and the
"imprecisions inherent in any award," the amount of a punitive
award is in the discretion of the jury in the particular case.
605 P.2d at 328.

In that case, this Court reinstated the jury

verdict even though the punitive damage award was substantially
greater than the compensatory award.

Upon rehearing, the re-

instatement was reversed because the plaintiff had not properly
perfected her appeal.

617 P.2d, supra.

Respondent Isom submits that there was no proper basis
upon which the trial judge remitted punitive damages to less
than one-half the amount awarded by the jury.

The court's

Order neither finds the award "shocking" nor engendered by
passion, prejudice or corruption by the jury.

(R. 115-16)

It was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to remit any
portion of the punitive damage award.

The full sum of the

jury's verdict should be reinstated by this Court--$65,000.00
compensatory damages and $35,000.00 punitive damages.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence before the jury was more than sufficient
to find that Appellant Leigh maliciously and intentionally
interfered with Defendant's business relations and forced
Defendant out of business.
in his tortious conduct.

In no wise was Plaintiff justified
Therefore, the jury's determination

of liability should be affirmed.
With regard to punitive damages, the trial court erred
in remitting a portion of the punitive damages as there is
no evidence or indication of passions or prejudice or that
the sum awarded was not reasonable.
The jury verdict should be reinstated in its entirely
by this Court and Defendant awarded $65,000.00 actual damages

and $35,000.00 punitive damages.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of March, 1981.

Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 south State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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Arthur B. Nielsen
Clark R. Nielsen

NIELSEN, HENRIOO, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Defendant
410 Newhouse Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone:

84111

521-3350

IN THE FIFTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LEIGH FURNITURE AND CARPET
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
AMENDED ANSWER
AND COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiff,

v.
T. RICHARD ISOM, d/b/a
RICHARD'S FINE FURNISHINGS,

Civil No. 5463

Defendant.

Leave of Court havinq been obtained, Defendant hereby

files his Amended Answer and Counterclaim against the Plaintif:
as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Said Complaint fails- to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
Answerinq the alleqations of said Complaint, Defendant

admits, denies, and alleqes as follows:
l.

Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraph 1.

2.

Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraph 2.

3.

Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraph J.

4.

Answering the all"egations of Paragraph 4' Defendant

denies that he has breached the covenants of the contract between
the parties and specifical~y denies the subparagraphs of said

Paragraph 4 except as hereinafter admitted.
(a)

Defendant denies that he was two months de-

linquent in the payment of rent at the time of the commencement of
this action.
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(b)

Defendant denies that he was in default at any

time in respect to the matte~s set forth in sUbparagraph (b) , but

alleges affirmatively that if there had ever been any default in

1

this particular, the same was waived by the Plaintiff.
(c)

Defendant denies that he was in default in re-

spect to the matters set forth in subparagraph (c) at the time of
the filing oL the action.
(d)

Defendant admits the provisions of the contract

as therein set forth and alleges that he has performed the terms

and conditions of said agreement in respect to maintaining an inventory.

(el

Defendant denies that he has been in violation

of the ?revisions of the contract referred to in Paragraph (e) and

alleges that in a.ny event any failure on Defendant's part to comply

strictly with the terms of such paragraph has been waived by the
Plaintiff.

(f)

Defendant denies the allegations contained in

subparagraph (f) and alleges affirmatively that any action in
apparent derogation of the written provisions of the contract has

been waived by the Plaintiff.
5.

Answering the allegations of Paragraph 5, Defendant

denies each and every allegation therein contained and alleges that

the security to be held for the Plaintiff under the agreement was
greatly in excess of the $27,000.00 still owed under the contract.
6.

Answering the allegations of Paragraph 6, ·Defendant

alleges that an audit was conunenced by Plaintiff's auditors and

Defendant specifically denies that he has failed to comply in any
way with the requirements therein alleged.

7.

Answering the allegations of

Parag~aph

7, Defendant

denies that he has in any way breached the agreement of May 14, 1970,
entitling the Plaintiff to cancel the contract and terminating the
Defendant's interests therein.

Defendant further alleges that he
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had prepaid payments on the contract and an additional payment was
not due until December, 1975.

Defendant further alleges that

Plaintiff was offered the last $27,000.00 due Wlder the contract
of May 14, 1970, but Plaintiff refused to take said payment.
Defendant further alleges that the Plaintiff has never
exercised any option to cancel said agreement and has not given to

the Defendant any notice of intention to terminate said agreement;
that by reason of said failure and also by reason of the

Plaintif~'s

refusal to accept the final payment of $27,000.00 due under the
contract, Plaintiff is not entitled to have a cancellation of said
agreement.

8.

Answering the allegations of Paragraph 8, Defendant

denies that the Plaintiff is entitled to any relief thereunder.
9.

Defendant denies each and every allegation of

Plaintiff's complaint not herein specifically admitted or denied.
THIRD DEFENSE
?urther answering said Complaint and by way of affirmative

defense thereto, Defendant alleges that any failure on the Defendant's
part to fulfill any of the terms and conditions of said contract
has been waived by the Plaintiff.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Further answerinq said Complaint and by way of affirmative
defense thereto, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is estopped to
assert any alleged failure on the part of the Defendant to comply
with the terms of said contract by virtue of the acts and con-

duct of the Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Defendant demands judgment as

hereinafte~

set :"orth.
COUNTERCLAIM
As a Counterclaim against the Plaintiff, Defendant alleges as follows:

.:;. 7of Museum and Library Services
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1.

On May 14, 1970, Defendant entered into the con-

tract with Plaintiff referred to in Plaintiff's Complaint, and
pursuant to said contract the Defendant took possession of the
property and business being purchased and the real property
leased and commenced the operation of a furniture business and
started the performance of said agreement.
2.

Approximately one year after entering into said

agreement, Plaintiff commenced a course of intentional, wilfull,
and malicious conduct designed to force the Defendant out of business and designed to bring the business relationship to an end so
that Plaintiff could take back the property.
3.

In furtherance of such plan and design, Plaintiff

continually harrassed Defendant and made threats of cancelling
said agreement.

Plaintiff attempted to sell the business and

property to others even though the agreement was still in good
standing.
4.

At the time this action was commenced by the Plaintif=,

Defendant was approximately ten months prepaid on the contract of
purchase and at that time had paid S53,000.00 of the original purchase price of sao,000.00, leaving only a balance of $27,000.00
owing.

Within two days after the action was filed and before

swranons was served upon the Defendant, Defendant paid the remaining $27,000.00 in escrow for the use of the Plaintiff and so notified the Plaintiff, but the Plaintiff refused to accept said
payment.

s.

The conduct of the Plaintiff as aforesaid, and in

other particulars not specifically alleged, was malicious, wilfull,
wanton and reckless, and desiqned to force the Defendant out of
business so that the Plaintiff could retake and resell the property to other parties at greatly increased profit, and said actions

~ave

been carriedcn by the Plaintiff in reckless disregard

for the rights of the Defendant and the Plaintiff's obligations
under the

c~ntract.
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Plaintiff's course of misconduct caused Defendant

to be evicted from the premises, forced Defendant out of business
and into bankruptcy, and otherwise caused him to suffer loss of
business and damage to his reputation, to his damage in the sum of
$100,000.00; that Plaintiff's actions have been wilfull, malicious,
and intentional, for which Plaintiff should pay punitive damages
of $100,000.00.
7.

·ay reason of the payments made by ~im, Defendant has

an interest in the real property described in the agreement {and
hereinafter described) , which interest should be determined and
awarded to him.

Any interest in said property determined to belong

to Plaintiff should be impressed with a lien to satisfy any judg

4

ment which Defendant might obtain against Plaintiff.
The ground floor and basement and all other space,
including the warehouse and outside parking area
~ow used by the present furniture store on the property at 8 East Tabernacle Street, St. George, Utah
and desc=ibed as follows:
Commencing at a point 37.5 feet east of the
northwest corner cf Let 5, Block 15, ?lat A.
St. George City Survey and running thence east
78.25 feet; south 40 feet; east 16.5 feet; south
92 feet; east 33 feet; south 119 feet; west
165 feet more or less to the west line of
Lot 5; thence north 197 feet 11 inches~ east
37 feet 3 inches; north 53 feet 1 inch to beginning, BUT SUBJECT to the right of way for
the adjoining Watson property.
BUT EXPRESSLY EXCLUDING all upstairs rental
partments in the building on the property.
8.

Defendant is entitled to recover a reasonable at-

torney's fee in connection with this action.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment against the
Plaintiff as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed.

2.

That Defendant be awarded compensatory damages in

the S\Jl!\ of $100, 000. 00 and punitive damages in the s\Jl!\ of $100, JOO. oo.
3.

That Defendant's interest in and to the above-

described real property be determined and awarded to him and any
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remaining interest of Plaintiff be impressed with a lien to secure the payment of any judgment in Defendant's favor.
4.

Defendant prays for interest, attorney's fees, and

for his costs incurred herein and for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.

DATED this

~day

of May, 1977.

Clark R. Nielsen

NIELSEN, HENRICO, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Defendant

410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing Amended Answer and Counterclaim
by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to Gary R. Bowe,
Callister, Greene & Nebeker, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at his office

address 800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, this
-2ffeay of May, 1977.
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It is ag!"eed. tbat tb.e stock
i:i :be u.s1J.a: course o: -~l.i.s!.ness

placeme:its a.od also tba; t.::.e

a.cc. w:. -::i.

~!.x;~es

o:

::z:.e::-ct.c.:id!.se

tb.a

~sua:

'..ti::

Oe ·so1c.:.. .-

;iurchases and :-e-

a..::d equipment

w~ll.a!so

be

subject to rep:acemen: Out .ttat a:: ::-e?lacements ot merchandise and
equipment shall be

sub~ect

to tbe seller's lien on said pro;>erty u.Dtil

paid tor and in t.bis conr:ection, tbe seller agrees to t:ansfer tbe
title to a:.y equipment ::::i.ecessary torreplacement.

.agree a to_ keep

.ip

Also !;be i!ll.l.rcbaser;

the mercb..,,d1se· 1nventocy at all t1Jnes so that 1t,

together with :be casb. i:o.· the ba.zi~ and acccl.Ults receivable shall equal

at least

~60 1 000.00.

an accurate physical

Tbe purC.:::.aser also agrees to furnish to the seller
1.nve~tory

threa·montbs a::id also to

supp~y

Of all merchandise and

!llOntbly t1::::i.s.c.cial

e~uipment

each

s~atements.

Tb.a seller hereby leases a.:ld lets to tbe purctaser
the following described property:
The grow:d floor and oasement and all other space,
including the wa:-ebouse B.Dd outside parking area
now used by tbe present fu!"Il~tur e store o~ tbe property at 8 East Tabernacle Street, St. George, uta.b
and described as follows:
Commencing at a point 37.5 ~eet east at the
nortbwest corner of Loo 5, Block 15, Plat A.
St. George City Survey and rw:nin~ thence oast
?d.25 tee~; soutb 40 feet; eas~ ~o.5 fee~; so~tb
92 !eet; east 33 tee~; south 1:9 !eet; west 165
feet mo~e o~ loss ~o ~~e west li=e at ~at 5; tbence
nort= 197 1eet 11 inc1:es; east 37 feet 3 incbes;
· ::iorth 53 feet : !.:Jc!: to beginning, BUT SUBJZCT to
tbe rigbt at way tor 'the adjoining Watson property.
BUT EX?:tESS:.Y EXC!.WJ:~G al.l upstai:-s rental par~ents
in tbe bl.6.ild~=g on tbe ~:-operty.
The term ot tbis lease shal: be !or ten

y~ars

!rom date, witb

~n opti~n

to renew tor an add1t!onal 10 years under ~he same terms and Cond!t!ons
tor the re-newal term
except tbat the :ninl.mum ::iontbly rent/aa hereinafter set fprth aball be
governed by the consumers' ?rice Index at tbe time of the beginni::g of
the re-newal term as compared witb the Consumers' ?rice index at the
using $600.00 per :ionth as the base rental.
date bereotl. Tbe property is to be used at all times for the operation
of a furniture and interior decorator store.
monthly and slla.11 be

Tbe rent sball be: paid·

3% of gross salas for the previous month, _pay.ao::..e

on June lst, 1970 and on 'tbe same day ot each. :ontb.tbereatter, bu~
i. __ -

wi,th a mini:llum·monthly rent&.l of $500.00 per month in the· tirst ;ear
of this leaae

and a minimum monthly rental.of.$600~00.per month

.

';

•.·
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0
:t

"'::;:iereat:=e:•:.

aga~s':

taxes a.ssesseC.

damage

ca~sed

-:::a~

::.s agreed

tb.e

se:.:er

is t.:. ")ay

a::.

~Nv~.

:::.e ?roper't'j a.:lC.. a:.so i.3 to 4':eep :t.e.

to mercila::d!.se or tbe pi.ire.baser t:om t.b.e

~:-opi:r:i

:-ea:.

occu?~CJ

0~

tlle u.pstairs re:ita: ..:>!ts by ta.cants.
Regarding tbe outside :;;.arl<O.:lg lot above re:erred ; 0 ,

it is agreed tha :. tbe seller !.s res.erv!:ig tor tbe ase ot bis ups~a~:.

ao·

apartme:it ta.can ts, parld:ig stalls :or 25 cars and tba t tl::e area

._·joining .tb.e st_ore on the was: s!.de trom 'tl:.e ate.re to ~e gutter~.

to be 'used

night or

~or

wbe~

store

pa~k!.~g·duri~g s~ore

:be store

i7

Dot opeD tor

hours Cut zay

busi~ess,

~e ~sed

te~s.::s

by

a:

a:

tloe upstairs apartllle:>ts, wi tl:l all other space to be tl:le ;>arLi:g ""'
tor the ;>urcbaser 1 s busi.cess.
It is also agreed tbat tbe seller sh.al::. bave tbe

1-

"

gatio:i ot all exterior mai:ite:iance a:id

to tbe

repa~rs

ob:~.

b~i:d":g

b1.1t tbat the pu.rcbaser shall bave tbe obl!.gat!.n= tor al: intarior

repairs md re-modeli:lg a.cd decora:i.cg.

the

p~rchaser

It is agreed also :hat

s::allbave tbe obligation ot all

:ria~tena~ce

and

repairs ot the lle&tiz:ig, air co:idi tio:i!::g, pluml>i::g a:id elactrica:
systems tor the

turDit~e

s::ore space

:aa~o~

~o

tb.e purc!la.ser to

the extent _or the f'irst $500. 00 tor t!le cost or :-epai!"s and. rep!ae1·
.me:>ta, with tbe seller sta.cdi::g all ax;>e.cse ot replacemei:ts a=d
repairs-1:1 excess ot $$00.00 tor a:iy o:ie replaceme.ct or r<1paJ:.

It !a t~tller
-:pay tor tlleir

0W?1·

.•r.••ti

~at tl:e ~patairs apar=ie.cta e~a:.:

electricity and also tl::e. total cost o! llot wa:"

· -llea ti.cg a:>d -also the purcbaser agrees to ma.1.c tai:> a.cd keep in opo:·
atio:i the bot water beater a.cd turioace wlliclo supply the beat rw:d
loot water tor tlle tur:>iture · at~re a.cd also- tlle '1;>stairs. apart:::e':'
but !t ia agreed 'that tbe seller is to sta.cd and :pay

oO:' ot

the""

·· ot space,lle&1:!:>g, ;>ayable eacll :iio:itb beat is tur.cisloed tll• ap&rae:'·
-It is also agreed tbat :io part ot tbe ;oroperty berei'
/.
qr tbis lea.se assigned
leased may be sub-leased/to a::J.Y cellar ;oari:y witllo1.1t the con ..ct o:
. tbe seller tirst load and obtai:ied.

Tlle purcb.aser al.so agrees to li'

- llis stock ot merc!:a~dise a.::d_ also tloe equipme:it i.nsured .aga1cst
by tire am alao to mai:ltai:: liability i:>aura.cce at all ti.mas.'

.t Is

·.~g~eed t'Cat

..

~

at sue::. tlone as ~he :::.: ---:-:~
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bava tbe _ap::.on to pi.;.Z"c::::iasa tbe

a~ove

desc:oibed :-eal p·rape:-ty, in-··.'-..·

clu.c!..!.11g the ~?3':a:..:-s :-er.tal a:;:ia.:ot:::le::tz, a: a p:-ice :a b_e d.e;ar:ii;:ied
by a coD:.!ttee ot tb:-ee appraisers, ~ne ot ~om.sball be appointed
by tb.e seller, one by ~e ;HJ.:>c.b.aser ~d ;be two so appoin~e.d sball

appoint a third member and all si:all be o"siness men or rEl'l estate
appraiser• ot St, .George, Utah.

Upon payc:.ent ot the P"rel>ase. price

so dete.rm.ined, tbe purcl::iasers sbal.l be entitled to a Warranq- :Oeed.

tor the prope:-107 and also an abstract ot title.or policy at.title

11

insu.ra.cce, a.bowing t.itle, ·thereto to be

the 19::..ler, :"re• and olear

· ot al·l lier:s, cla.!.:J.s, clouds and e:ccu:nbrances.
It is ti.J.r'Cl:ler.agreed by

.-

·•,.·.•.

::!le parties, that tbe'above

, descril>ed •tock ot merchanciise and equipment iu:d t!.%tures ·are being
sold

·.··,

prior

:~ee

and clear ot all liens, cla!.:r..s and indebted.!less

'Oo Ja.n ..acy

i~cu.rred

l, 1970, with the purchasers to pay all cla!ms and

indebtedness incu.rred &1"ter said date and tbe seller also agree s to
comply witb _tbe Sulk

~ranster

State ot Utah ill reference

Laws at

to thia sale.
T!le seller expressly agrees that tor a

p~~od

ot ten

years "trom tbe .. ,date bereo!', it will =o. -c ei 1;l:er d!rectly or. i!lcilrectl:r,
engage ~·or be co::ected with a tur::i~µre, ·appli&:lce or interior
decorator store i:l wasbi!lgton

also apply to ';be said

w.

c0wit7,

'Utab 8.Dd this restriction sl:lall

S.Leigh personally,

Time is ot tbe essence ot tbis purcbase ag!"eemez:i't· aod

lease and in the •vent

o:

a de:a..it in any payment provided.tor herein,

or a detault i:l the pertorm.ance ot

&!ly

other condition herein set

oO

d&ya after said payment or pertormanca is d~e. the
.
..
'
seller may a'; its option, .cancel .and 'te:uillate this agreement and

forth and :or

lease and be relieved of .all obligations ot perrormance and all payments thiu-etoforemade ·shall be forfeited as liq~id&ted damages
and ·the •eller shall be entitled to tbe ill:mediata 'possession of the·
,merchandise and property herei:l ..agreed to be. aold .. ~d also sbdl
be entitled.·.to the poe.sessioz:i. ot tbe roal pro~er:' )erei:c· leased

..,,,

'···

~

.,

'> - . :: ~ .

"_.

<.

-

·'

:..'.':·~.~:··

~
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AGREEMfili T

AGREEME.~T

TSIS

mace and entered into cilis

~

day

of September, 1972, by and between LEIGH :'=ITUl\E !\ND CARPET
COMPAbi"Y. a corporation,

(hereinafter refer=ed to as "LEIGH")

and T: RlCHARD ISOM (hereinafter refer=ed to as "ISOM") an indi~idua~ doing

business as •Richard's F~ne Furnishings• of St.

George, Utah, WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties to this Agreement had previously

entered into an agreement dated the 14th day of May, 1970, wherein
•r.eigh

11

as t.he seller and •tsom" as the purchaser agreed, among

other things, as follows:
a)

11

Leigh 11 sold to •tsom" the complete i:.ventory and

eq..;ipment of a furniture business located in St. George, Utah:
b)

0

Lei9h 11 leased to azsom" certain real property

located in St. George, Utah, said property to be used by "Isom"

for the purpose of operating a retail furniture business.

Lease

was to run ten years with an option of renewal for ten years;
c)

•tsom• also was granted an option to purchase the Ieased

premises upon payment in full of the purchase contract for the inventory and equipment; and
WHEREAS, there has accrued curing the term of the prior
agreement various disputations between the parties thereto giving
:ise to a threatened impairment of nleigh s• security for completion
1

ot the aforesaid a9:eement: and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are desirous of clarifying
their respective positions relative to the prior agreement and
avoiding any future conflicts arising from interpretation of said
pr.:.or agreeme.."lt:
-l-
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NOW TSEREFORE, Leigh Fu:ni tu re and Carpet Company, a

corporation, and T. Richard Isom. mutually cove!'}ant and agree
as follows:
l.

This Agreement does not alievate

~he

obligations

incurred by the parties pursuant to the agreement dated May 14,
1970.

Neither party relinquishes or waives any rights to

t!'le terms of

t.~at

prior agreement.

en!o~: 1 '

However, where t!'le terms ar.:

covenants of this Agreement clearly and urunistaka.bly conflict
with or

~edify

the terms of the prior agreement,

t~e

te::ns

agreement shall gover:i the rights and obligations of t..'le
2.

"Isom" aqrees to pay to

11

of~

par~:ei

!..eigh u upon execution of

this Agreement: the sum of Ten Thousand Dolla::s ($10,000.00).
"Isom .. further agrees to pay to "Leigh" an additional Ten
Dollars ($10,000.00) on o:: before Janua::y 15, 1973.

~01m:_ 1

The afore·

mentioned payments shall be credited to the unpaid pu::chase pr::,
of the May 14, 1970, agreement and "Isom" agrees to continue t:
make t.i.e lease and interest payments as set for"th in that ag:ee:r
3.

"Isom" agrees that should be default in making t:le

payments provided for in the precedir.9 para9raph that he will
immediately turn over the operation and management of the bus...::e!
known as -·"Richard's Fine Furnishings" to "Leigh".

"Isom" agreii

that should said default occur t.'1e same shall te::minate all of
"Isom's 11 claim. or right to enforce t..i.e prior aqreement of May l•
1970.

In essence, "Isom• a9::ees that default on this Agre.,..,,:

will also ~. construed as a material breach of the former aqre~

and hence immediate forfeiture of "Isom' s" interest in said aqret·

m.ent.
4.

It is agreed that for purposes of calculat.ing the

$60,000.00 minimum of "merchandise inventory •

. . toqetne: .,,:·

the cash in the bank and accounts receivable• as pr::>vided for::
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~he second page of the prior agreement, there shall be deducted

the sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) from the inventory
as indicated on the financial statement of "Isom".

This sum

represents a continge.."lt claim to inventory by Mr. ?:ancis L .. .Leany •
.. Isom_'" does not acquiesce to t..'le validity of said conti.ngent claim
but does agree to the :eduction for t..~e purposes set for'":...., above.

·.s.

It is agreed between t.."le parties that before "!som"-

sells, transfers or in any manner di!!uses his present ownership
i:i.terest in the business known as "Richard's Fine Furnishings"
or any furniture business wherein "Isom" has an ownership inte:es-:
and which is located in St. George, Washington County, State of
Utah, he shall first obtain wri'tten approval of "Lel.gh''.

Ol.ffusion

of "Isom' s" present ownership interest could take the for.n of a
partnership arrangement (limited or general), sale of a portion of
~he

business, selling a corporate interest if the business is in-

corporated or any other method of reducing
o~ership

of

t.~e

business.

~Isom•s

.. present 100%

•Isom• shall seek approval by subtcitting

a written request disclosing the person, persons or business

en~ity

that proposes to become involved, as an owner. or capl.tal investor
of "Richard• s Fine Furnishings"' its successors and assigns.

"Leigh ..

shall respond to· "Isom's" request wit.'lout inordinate delay, by
either approving said request or stating the basis upon which "Leigh"
refuses the request.
6.

•Isom"' agrees that "!.eigh• is entitled to =ak.e bi-

annual audits of •rsom•s• business records beginning January l, 1973,

and every six months

t.~ereafter.

•Leigh• agrees that said audits

shall be made at nLeigh s• expense and shall be so conducted as to
1

avoid any interference with the normal operation of "Isom•s•
business ..
7.
insurance

..Isom" agrees to furnish "Leigh• a policy of fire

coveri~g

the inventory of the furniture business wherein
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c

0

.. :.eigh" s1;.a!l ~e desii;:ia.tad as a ":.Oss Payee...

Sai.C. -;>o:.:..cy s~a::

be in an amou.nt equal to or exceeding t..":.e un?aid ba:.ance on t:.".e
inve~tory-equipment

?U:c!lase

fire insura..--ice in !:-.:.ll force
t.~e

aq:ee:.~~.

a.~d

:la:..::..t.a:...~

:l:ai:ure to

sa;.:

effect du:ing the durat.:..on ct

p'IK'chase agreeme::.t shall const;.tute a Qatarial

breac~

o!

cont:act.

'a.
interest.

:.n

11

a.~d

F..:rnishings".
o>ecess~

Iso::." agrees t...~at "!.e:.;=." is er.t~-:.::..ed ':.o a sec:.;.::;:

to al! a.c.::ounts

receiv~la

of

"Ric~arci.'

s P:..ne

Isom f".l:t:"ler a;:ees to execute any arH:! al:.. docume:.:;:

to pledge sud accounts raceivabla as

securi~

I

I

for pay·

me.it of the balance of the i..'1.vent.ory-equipm.ent purchase agree.;.e:;,
•r.eig:h" agrees t..'lat. upcn receipt of paymene i."l full of said ag:ee·I

:ent, to release said security interest and also t..'le secur:.cy
interest that "Leigh" present.ly has ir.

9.

•Isom" ac;rees t..'"i.at a!-:er

to which the prepayme..,t of

pri~cipal

11

:soon 1 s" i..,ventor;, :ne:c:t·

~!le

expi::a::ion of t..';.e pe::;:

is applicable as set

for~:..'.,

paragraph #2 herein, he s!lall resu:ne payments on t.."'le u.npa_.d Cala:\

.... required in the May l4, l970, as=eement.
lO.

I

•Isom 11 furt..i.er agrees to pay to "Leigh• t..'le sumo:

T!lree Bundnd Fifty Six and 70/lOO Dollars ($356. 70). rep:ese.·.:::;i
the l97l inventory taX mistakenly paid by "Leigh", said tax l>•'-'!

Dated

~e

date first appearing above.
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!

/
ll•ry a. 11...,. of
CALL?sna, DSLD • CALLIIDR
U'!Oalln'S roa Pi:..uJITin
IVUS llOO DlnlZCOTT 8111LD?ll0
SALT ~ CI'n', UTAll Nlll

til:iill. . . 363-3819
'-:~.... ~J!_·'"

'ff ,<:>~ii/:

!m: DIS'!'l.Ic:T COURT l'Oa WUBUOTCl9

n.r.n or

coanr

ll'TAll

!l'

LllIQll l'VlllITOU: lllD c:unT

<

..

'

·1

COllPM11', • Vtah Corpor•tian,

Pl•1atiff,

-·-

C.i.v1l llo.

T. llCll.UD ISOfl, dba Uc::BMD'S

PISJ: PValiISBIMGS,

ft• plaintiff c:omplaiH

ot th• defendilllt, T. IU.c:hard

laOll,

and for .,.,.•• of ..:tian •lle9•• •• foll...,.,
1.

fte plaintiff bere1n Ill • corpontian ahUn9

bf •irtue

of the l - • of the State of vtah with iu princ:ip.11l place of l:la•i-

11•••

ill Ce4ar City, Iran Coanty, ltate of Vtu.

2.

Defendant h

• reaidmt of WHbin9toa Cowaty, wbereill

... oper•te• • retail fllrlliblr• •tore kll- .. l.icbard'•

rill•

PunU.AiJ19a.

t;~~;

OD or ml>oat th• 14th day of . .,. 1970, th•

ad defendaat entered into • written 99r-at, • copy
•ttmcbed hereto •• Dhillit •a• and by ref•r•c• aade • part
wberebf the plaintiff (al Hld . .don• itma of

lier~,

u .... tozy aad

eqaip-

Mnt for which thol defecdat ai,rHCI to aak• ~t and (b) t.he
pl•intiff l•••ed t.o the def. .dmat

\
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4.

Tl>e defendallt h•• aater1•llJ breached the co•elZlti

of Ula afor-t1caed contract I.A the followiAg
(•)

tba deflllldaat

u

~-et principal md intenat

•llnAer 1

two •ontha delinquent ill Hkl•i
Oil

both Ula peracaal and real

pr~ ~rUODa of tile 89&'-t •

.

-'-

(aot part of the in••ncory !oat fised UHta) w1thoat nplacing th!

(c)

tile def8Ddant agreed to nplace the stock of

-rc:handia• aold in the ordinary coar9' of bual.Aeaa, which

dofed•1

J:au a.ot done.

1

(d)

l.D•Hto~

Defendant 99rffd to keep tlle -rchandiH

caah in bank and accCMU1ta recei•ule at all tia. . in an

mount~·

to do,

(e)

Def8Ddant agEeed to furniah the plaintiff ...

'

accurate physical in•entory of all -rchandiae and equipoent ucb
I

thr" •ontlla and alao to Apply - t h l J hoa.cial a t a t - t l ' die!'

defendant haa partially failed to ccaply with or haa Ilea

1111n11oo·I

'i

uly alow in faroiahiog aaid atat-ota.
(fl

·:"'•

co.:di'!-iaio9
..

::·!.;-

Jt waa f1lrtber agned by tile defeodant that ill

and electrical ay•U.a for th• farn1ture aton

11""

•118998 that defendant hu fail.ad to p.y for npaira th•t lien 11111
pertoraed oa Hid plaaloin9, heat1A9 and air cond1t1cmio9 aytteal•
(g)

Plaintiff llel1eN• 1111d therefore dl•CJ•• •P""

aac:h l.Afomat1on and !Mllaf tl>at def8Ddaat hu aul>-l•t certaiA

porUana of pr.al.•-· 1A partie11lu, certain parkiJlg u:eaa. I.I
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the plaintiff aeeka an order of thia Coart terainatin9 defendant'•
intereat in t.h• c<>11Uact and clirecUD9 th• defendut to 1-ediately
•aa.~.\IM

·'">.

prMii••• allawin9 tlle plaintiff to take po•••••iaa

~:·

~.
4

,.

6.

1'be plaiAtif f reallagea par1t9rapha tl - t5 of plain-

1.

Plaintiff allegea that puraaADt to tlle aforementioned

c::>ntract the plaint:i. ff vaa grutad a Mc:urity intareat in all
-rc:.b.andiM and in••ntory located on the buair>H• premiae• ;if th•
defendant, including raplac. . .nta and addition• to •aid merchandiaa
' and equipment.
i.

~·

defendant furtllar indic:atad the nature of plaintiff'•

which i• attached hereto aa &xhli>it •1• and by reference eade a
part hereof,
9.

Purauant to tba dafudnt'• aoat recent balance (copy

attached aa bhibit "C") tba defendant'• iAventoria• of -rchanc:iH
i• liatad aa •54,743.70, howe•ar, plaintiff allege• tllat aaid in-

•-tory i• 09eratatad by f4,000.00, ••id •ount rapreaenti.llg
in•entoS'J belonging to Jlr, l'rancia Leany aa per page one of the

abo91A lla properly •boon> u

·--=", ..•..•~ ui.

'50, 743. 70.
~

Plaintilf belie••• and

allege• that tlaa

ac:co-ta

UpOll

..

informatiOll and bali.e6

Payable a.11- an SZllibit

•c•

of

'52,156.60 repraaent alaoet eAtirelr creditor8 vlao ba.... •applied
in.._tory to tba defandaat.

tl, &ltltougb plaintiff claiaa a priority interHt in the
llfo ... aaJ.d •rcbandiM iA-toZ]' it ia appazeDt that plaiJltiff'a
cl818 of f47,000.00 dae ca tlaa ooaUact betveea plaiAtiff and
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•
detendMt i• in ••riou• jecpardy fr,. elai•• of ereditou •h•Zllo
tl>e pl•int:i.ff would l>e •lll>Jected to n,..erou• defen••• ot 11:1

priority poaitian.

u.

Plaintiff aUe9•• that the defendant hH a ciu:ront

in••MlrJ' of

•so, 743. 70

•:i.th real Md poaaJ.l>l• or eonti:lqut •lllai,

to ilaid iierc:l>Mdiff in tile ...,...,t of fl00,3S2.88.

(Pl.unutt• 1

c:laill of f47, 000.001 ia•eatory m:editor•' c:Laa of Ul, U6 • .a 1 11d
accrued tmiee of f2,1'6.21).
lJ.

Plaintiff all999• tllat ita •ec:or1ty po•itia11 I.JI

aaterially tl>z:eatened by tl>e c:urrat financ::i.el •tatua of the d..

1

eo.I

fendant'• bu•ineur thet anl••• a receh•d ia appointed by the

!Jmediataly the plaintiff •tand• to lo•• aonaideral>le in . .1taont u
will other c:reditor• of the defendant.

lfberefore the plaintilf

allege• that it would l>e in ti>• beat int•raau at. all ;-artie1 coo•
c:erned th•t the

C~t

1

. . t a time and pl11ee for a he•r1nq puuuant

to &ule 66 of the Ota!> aulea of Ciwil Procedure, for th• parpcP :
o.f

appointin9 a bc:eiwer to tD:e 1-diate operatioc of 1Ucbatd'1

.
1

Piu rurniabin9a for the protectian of plainti.ff aad otller crril~~
of the defendllllt.
14.

1·

Plaintiff l>eli•••• ad •11•9•• apon aocb belief t111t
I

l>ec:•o•e of the aatore of defeadaat' • l:la•in••• •11 in•entocy to

>lid,

plaintUf'• eec:oril:J' interaat •ttac:hea 1• mol>jec:t to r•09al, d""'
of

~inll

loet or liqaidatioe.

tcdaat u

fol.1011111

nuT
l.

J'CN:

c:.\lllS

or

M:ftc.

terain•tiae of ~ coaUect (h.bibit "A") porsullt

to the tanaa of aaid c:ODtzaort arida9 f r - dd•du&'• . . urill

br•ach of the .....
---':.
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2.

f:>r .., order of the C:nart diracti.119 defendant to t11rn

over U...di•t• poaaeaaicm of th• pr . .iaea, incloding th• aerchandiae

--ta

J.
peid

'·

lor the !Orefeitore paraoant to the CQDtr8Ct, Of all
p11rauant to the COllUact aa liquidated d-ag... . .cc~·
ror coeta of COOU't illc11rred herein ud a11ch other -4

furtber reliaf u

1.

the C<>ut de. . . j11at to ..ud in th• pr•i•••·

ror teraination of the COlltract (Ezhibit "A") por•uet

to t!le ter•• of Hid contract ariaing fro. de!endaat'• !>reach of the

......

2.

ror tlle appoiataeDt of a llecaiver puuuaat to bl• 6&.

Ot&ll Rulea of Civil Pr.,.,edure to take iluaediate poaaa••iQQ Of the

buain••• kn"""' •• Richard'• fiD• ruriai•bin9• to either liquidate
the • - or to operate the

bu•in•••

ontil •ac:h time u

the CQQrt

deceit appropriate to liquidate the llaaiD••• or •hoold the boain••• ••tabliab a aore •t&llla financial •tatoa, thu to tarn the
operation OYer to the defendant.
l.

ror co•ta of coart incurr•d llerein ud •ac:h other and

further relief u

the Coa.rt da_. juat to ..ard in the pr-iHa.

Dated thia _

day of lepteaber, 1972.

ft

Adit"eH Of Pl•intif f 1

/8/ Q!n a. ..,...
Attorney• for Plaiat•f f
laita 800 IEeDDeCott ... ildia9 .·.
lalt Lake Cit7, vtah IMlll. ~-~·
-:~····~·':.

Cedar City, Otab

-5-
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Gary R. Howe
CALLISTER, GREENE l NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone 531-7676

IN THE DISTRlCT·COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY

................
STATE OF UTAH

LEIGH FURNITURE AND CARPET
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation ,

Plaintiif,
COMPLAINT
vs.
T. RICHARD ISOM, dba RICHARD'S
FINE FURNISHINGS,
Defendant .

Civil No .

.5 .y"t 3

................

The plaintiff complains of the Defendant, T. Richard Isom, and for cause
of action alleges as follows:
1. The plaintiff herein is a corporation existing by virtue o! the laws of the
State of Utah with its principal place of business in Cedar City, Ir<>n County,
State of Utah .
2. Defendant is a resident of Washington County, where he operates a
retail furniture store known aa Richard's Fine Furnishings.
3. On or about the 14th day of May, 1970, the plaintiff and defendant ente1'd
into a written agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto a.s Exhibit "A" and by
reference made a part hereof, whereby the plaintitf (a) sold various items of
inventory and equipment for which the defendant a~eed to make payment and
(b)

the plaintiff leased to the defendant a retail furniture store located in St.

George, Washington County, State of Utah.
4. The defendant has materially breached the covenants of the a!oremention~
contract in the following manner:
(a) The defendant is two months delinquent in making payment on
, the lease portion of the agreement.
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-2(b)

The defendant has sold various sewing machines (not part of

the inventory but fixed assets) without replacing the same as agreed to on page

2 of the agreement.
Cc) The defendant agreed to replace the stock of merchandise sold
: in the ordinary course of business, which defendant has not done.

:
1

(d) Defendant agreed to keep the merchandise inventory, cash in

:! bank and accounts receivable at all times in an amount equal to or in excess of

,1

'; $60,000.00 in value. which defendant has Called to do.
(e) Defendant agreed to furnish the plaintiff "an accurate physical
inventory of all merchandise and equipment each three months and also to supply

monthly financial statements" which defendant has partially failed to ccmply with
or has been unreasonably slow in furnishing said statements.

en

Plaintit! believes and therefore alleges upon such information

': and belief that defendant has sub-let certain portions of premises, in particular,

,i certain parking areas, in contravention of the agreement.
5. The plaintiff believe• and alleges upon Information and belief that the
1

present market value of defendant's given inventory is less than the amount due

and owing to the plaintiff pursuant to the attached agreement. That amount being
1

in the sum of $27 ,000.00'. Plaintiff further alleges upon Information and belief

1that defendant's equity interest in the available inventory is virtually nil.
6. Plaintiff has requested the opportunity to take a physical inventory and
; complete audit of defedant's business at plaintilf's expense. Said audit having
1
;1 been agreed to by defendant

in an agreement between the parties dated September.

'!

1972; however, defendant has refused plaintiff's request for such an audit.

1

seeks an order of this Court terminating defendant's Interest in said agreement

7. Pursuant to the default provisions of the attached agreement the plaintiff

'! and directing

the defendant to immediately vacate the premises allowing the

plaintiff to take possession thereof.

s.

In the alternative the plainti!f seeks a Temporary Restraining Order

from the above-entitled Court re•training defendant from further conducting
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.i
!I business
;1

in any manner whatsoever at the location of "Richard's Fine furnishl!lg 5.

in St. George. Utah, until such time as a complete certified audit can be takenol

I
·: said business. Plaintiff further requests that i!, in fact, said audit Should disdo;.

that plaintl!t's security is in jeopardy or that the terms and conditions of the

'i attached agreement have not been complied with

by the defendant as alleged

he~,

. that pursuant to Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a receiver be appoc:
1
1
:

by the Ceurt for purposes of liquidating the existing inventory pursuant to the

:1 terms and conditions of the attached agreement.
WHEREFORE , plaintiff pnys for judgment against the defendant as follows:
I

I. For an order of the above-entitled court terminating defendant's intem1

.

in the agreement dated the 14th day of !\lay , 19 70, and vesting in plaintiff immeifu:•

1

possession to the premises descrll>ed in said agreement.

!

I

2. That a Temporary Restraiiting Order be issued forthwith restrainingd&j
from further conducting any business whatsoever at the business known as

"Richard's Fine Furnishings," St. George, Utah, until such time as a certified
audit can be taken and filed with the above-entitled court. I! in the opinion oi
1

this court the aforesaid audit evidences a failure on the part of the defendant to

, maintain proper security for repayment of the obligation presently due and OWlll!
: to the plaintiff, that in that event a receiver be immediately appointed for purpoS<
of liquidating the business known as "Richard's Fine Furnishings." Said liqwd!:i
to proceed in accordance with the terms and conditions o! the May 14, 1970

I

!!agreement. U reasonable liquidation tails to produce the sum of $27 ,000.00
:ithen upon said occurance plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant for
I the

amount of said deficiency.
3, For other and further relief as the Court deems just to award in the

11

,I

premises .

DATED this

-11....~ll'f of February. 1975'

--&:? ,{'. """
Gary R Howe
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I served the forgoing Brief by
mailing two copies, postage prepaid, to Gary R. Howe and

w.

Clark Burt, 800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84133, Attorneys for Appellant, this 26th day of March, 1981.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

